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INTRODUCTION

O

n February 7, 2011, an anonymous Massachusetts resident
1
tweeted Detroit Mayor David Bing: “Philadelphia has a statue
of Rocky & Robocop would kick Rocky’s butt. He’s a GREAT
2
ambassador for Detroit.” Mayor Bing responded that “[t]here are not
any plans to erect a statue to Robocop. Thank you for the
3
suggestion.”
While Mayor Bing did not think Detroit needed a statue of its
fictional cybernetic guardian, the Internet disagreed. On February 9,
4
2011, the Detroit nonprofit The Imagination Station created the
1 A “tweet” is a 140-character-maximum message posted on the Twitter website. See
The Story of a Tweet, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/what-is-twitter/story-of-a-tweet
(last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
2 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com
/projects/imaginationstation/detroit-needs-a-statue-of-robocop?ref=category (last visited
Aug. 2, 2014). RoboCop is a 1987 science-fiction/action film about a Detroit police officer
who is murdered by a street gang and reincarnated as RoboCop, a crime-fighting cyborg.
See ROBOCOP (Orion Pictures Corporation 1987); RoboCop, IMDB, http://www.imdb
.com/title/tt0093870/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
3 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2.
4 The Imagination Station of Roosevelt Park is a Michigan nonprofit corporation.
Corporate Entity Details, Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs,
MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/bcs_corp/dt_corp.asp?id_nbr=70712P&name
_entity=THE%20IMAGINATION%20STATION%20OF%20ROOSEVELT%20PARK
(last visited Aug. 2, 2014). It is either not eligible for or has not applied for federal taxexempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012). See Exempt Organizations Select Check,
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Kickstarter project “Detroit Needs A Statue of Robocop!” The goal
of the project was to raise $50,000 to construct a RoboCop statue in
6
Detroit. Less than two months later, 2718 people had pledged to
contribute a total of $67,436 to the project in exchange for various
7
8
rewards. Three years later, the statue is almost complete.
The RoboCop statue was an early crowdfunding success.
“Crowdfunding” is a way of using the Internet to raise money by
9
asking the public to contribute to a project. In the past, asking a large
number of people to contribute small amounts of money to a project
was expensive and inefficient for most organizations and individuals.
10
By greatly reducing transaction costs, crowdfunding enables anyone
to inexpensively and efficiently seek small contributions to a project.
While crowdfunding is a new model of fundraising, it has already
transformed funding for the arts. For example, the crowdfunding
platform Kickstarter distributed more than forty million dollars to the
creators of almost seventy-five hundred projects within two years of
11
Kickstarter’s launch. On March 3, 2014, Kickstarter announced that
it had received more than one billion dollars in pledges from 5.7
12
million backers. By comparison, the 2014 budget for the National
IRS,
http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/pub78Search.do?searchChoice=ePostcard&dispatch
Method =selectSearch (Select: “Were automatically revoked”; Search: “27-3164734” “The
Imagination Station of Roosevelt,” “Detroit,” “MI”) (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
5 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2. Kickstarter is an online fundraising
tool that focuses on funding creative projects. See generally Seven Things to Know About
Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer (last visited May
28, 2014).
6 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2.
7 Id. Rewards included opportunities to visit the statue “in style” and meet-and-greet
events with “other cool Detroit peoples.” Id.
8 See Julie Hinds, RoboCop Statue in Hands of a Master from Venus Bronze Works in
Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 17, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://www.freep.com/article
/20140217/ENT01/302170017/RoboCop-statue-Giorgio-Gikas-Detroit; Lee DeVito, Take
a Look at Detroit’s RoboCop Statue, METROTIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://metrotimes.com
/news/take-a-look-at-detroit-s-robocop-statue-1.1629190.
9 Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is
-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
10 A “transaction cost” is “a cost incurred in making an economic exchange.”
Transaction Cost, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_cost (last visited
June 3, 2014). Transaction costs include search and information costs. Id.
11 See Yancey Strickler, Happy Birthday Kickstarter!, in Kickstarter Blog,
KICKSTARTER (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.kickstarter.com/blog/happy-birthday-kick
starter.
12 OMG, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/1billion (last visited Aug. 2,
2014). For current data on Kickstarter, see Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter
.com/help/stats (last updated Aug. 2, 2014, 2:17 PM).

FRYE (DO NOT DELETE)

158

10/1/2014 1:24 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93, 155

13

Endowment for the Arts was $146 million. Kickstarter is only one
of many crowdfunding platforms, which have collectively distributed
14
billions of dollars to creative and charitable projects.
This Article argues that crowdfunding has succeeded, at least in
part, because it makes charitable giving more efficient by solving
certain “charity failures,” or inefficiencies created by the inability of
the charitable contribution deduction to subsidize the charitable
giving from low-income donors. The economic subsidy theory of the
charitable contribution deduction explains that the deduction is
justified because it solves market failures and government failures in
charitable goods. According to this theory, free riding causes market
15
failures in charitable goods, and majoritarianism causes government
failures in charitable goods. The charitable contribution deduction
solves these market and government failures by indirectly subsidizing
charitable contributions, thereby compensating for free riding and
16
avoiding majoritarianism.
The economic subsidy theory consists of an empirical hypothesis
and a normative claim. The empirical hypothesis is that the charitable
contribution deduction solves market failures and government
failures; the normative claim is that this increased efficiency justifies
17
the deduction. This Article takes no position on the normative
claim, but argues that the remarkable success of crowdfunding helps
confirm the empirical hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory.
The empirical hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory implies
that the charitable contribution deduction is itself inefficient because
it cannot solve market and government failures in contributions by
low-income donors. The subsidy provided by the deduction depends
on a donor’s marginal tax rate, so the deduction provides a large
subsidy to most high-income donors, and little or no subsidy to most

13 See Appropriations History, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, http://arts.gov/open
-government/national-endowment-arts-appropriations-history (last visited Aug. 2, 2014).
14 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5.
15 “Majoritarianism” is “a traditional political philosophy or agenda which asserts that a
majority . . . of the population is entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has
the right to make decisions that affect the society.” Majoritarianism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majoritarianism (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
16 See JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 109,
113 (1995).
17 See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J.
1047, 1058–59, 1077 (2009).
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low-income donors.
And if the deduction cannot subsidize
contributions from low-income donors, the deduction cannot solve
market and government failures in those contributions. I will refer to
this inefficiency as a “charity failure.”
This Article argues that crowdfunding is successful because it
provides a technological solution to some of those charity failures.
While the charitable contribution deduction causes charity failures
because the deduction cannot subsidize contributions from lowincome donors, crowdfunding can subsidize those contributions by
offering rewards instead. As a result, crowdfunding should solve at
least some of the charity failures caused by the deduction through
providing an incentive for low-income donors to contribute. The
remarkable success of crowdfunding suggests that the inefficiency
associated with charity failures is quite large.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the economic
subsidy theory of the charitable contribution deduction. Part II shows
why the premises of the economic subsidy theory imply that the
deduction causes charity failures. Part III argues that crowdfunding
can solve at least some of those charity failures. And Part IV suggests
that the success of crowdfunding may reflect persistent inefficiency in
the market for charitable goods.
I
THE ECONOMIC SUBSIDY THEORY OF THE CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION
The charitable contribution deduction allows certain taxpayers to
deduct specific charitable contributions from their income tax base
19
under limited circumstances. The economic subsidy theory of the
charitable contribution deduction argues that the deduction is justified
because it solves market failures and government failures in
20
21
charitable goods. Classical economics predicts that free riding will
cause market failures in public goods and majoritarianism will cause
18

See infra notes 67–83 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012).
20 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113. For the purpose of this Article,
“charitable goods” are goods produced by a charity in furtherance of its charitable mission.
21 “Classical economics” refers to the economic theories written between 1776 through
the early 1930s. KEYNES AND THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS: THE EARLY DEBATE ON
POLICY ACTIVISM 1, available at http://wps.aw.com/wps/media/objects/11/11640/rohlf
_keynes_and_classical.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). “[T]he most important element of
classical economic thought was the belief that a market economy would automatically tend
toward full employment.” Id. at 1-2.
19
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government failures in public goods. The economic subsidy theory
predicts that free riding and majoritarianism will also cause market
failures and government failures in charitable goods because they
23
often resemble public goods. It also argues that the charitable
contribution deduction eliminates the inefficiency caused by those
market failures and government failures by indirectly subsidizing
24
charitable contributions.
A. Nonprofits and Charities
A nonprofit organization (“nonprofit”) is an organization that is
subject to the nondistribution constraint, which provides that a
nonprofit cannot distribute its assets to its controlling persons and
25
must use its assets to advance the nonprofit’s social purpose. A
26
charity is a nonprofit organization with a charitable purpose. All
charities are nonprofit organizations, but not all nonprofit
organizations are charities. Some nonprofits benefit their members,
which is a non-charitable purpose, but many nonprofits benefit the
27
public, which may be a charitable purpose.
Under federal law, an organization is a charity only if the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) determines that it is exempt from taxation
under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which effectively defines a charity as a
nonprofit organization that is “organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
28
educational purposes,” among other things.
However, many
nonprofit organizations that satisfy the criteria set forth in § 501(c)(3)
29
do not apply for tax-exempt status. Moreover, the criteria set forth
22 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale
for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J.
54, 67–69 (1982).
23 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113.
24 See, e.g., id. In theory, the deduction “solves” market failures and government
failures by enabling charities to provide the optimal amount of charitable goods. See id.
25 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 56–57.
26 See generally Charitable Organization, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Charitable_organization (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
27 See Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS,
http://nccs.urban.org/resources/faq.cfm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
28 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
29 For example, organizations with less than fifty thousand dollars in annual gross
receipts are only required to file a 990-N, but many do not. Instructions for Form 990-EZ Notices, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990ez/ar02.html#d0e5162 (last visited Aug.
3, 2014); Scope of the Nonprofit Sector, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, http://www.independent
sector.org/scope_of_the_sector (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
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in § 501(c)(3), as interpreted by the IRS, may not exhaust the scope of
charitable purposes.
The customary definition of charity may include purposes and
organizations excluded by the federal statutory definition. “Charity”
is generally defined as “[t]he voluntary giving of help, typically in the
form of money, to those in need,” and a “charity” is generally defined
as “[a]n organization set up to provide help and raise money for those
30
in need.”
Accordingly, purposes and organizations that are not defined as
charities under federal law may still be charitable in a colloquial
sense. More specifically, while an organization is not a charity under
federal law unless the IRS determines that it is exempt from taxation
in accordance with § 501(c)(3), most people would agree that an
organization is a charity if it has a charitable purpose, whether or not
it has registered with the IRS or can qualify for federal tax-exempt
status.
B. Charitable Contributions
Federal law defines a charitable contribution as a donation to a
charity, and most charitable contributions are potentially tax
31
deductible. In other words, taxpayers may be able to deduct
32
charitable contributions from their taxable income. Taxpayers
deduct a substantial amount of charitable contributions. For example,
in 2010, taxpayers claimed about $291 billion in charitable
33
contribution deductions.
However, many donations that satisfy the popular definition of a
“charitable contribution” do not satisfy the federal definition. Either
the organization that receives the donation has not applied for tax-

30 Charity, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition
/american_english/charity (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
31 See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a).
32 Tax income is defined as gross income less any deductions. See What Is Taxable and
Nontaxable Income?, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self
-Employed/What-is-Taxable-and-Nontaxable-Income (last visited July 15, 2014).
33 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2011) [hereinafter
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND], available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html
?func=select&id=50 (click “JCX 55-11”).
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exempt status, or the recipient of the donation does not qualify as a
34
charity under § 501(c)(3).
C. The Economic Subsidy Theory
The charitable contribution deduction indirectly subsidizes the
production of charitable goods by reducing the cost of charitable
35
contributions. When taxpayers deduct charitable contributions from
their taxable income, they reduce their tax burden and the government
receives less tax revenue. Effectively, the deduction provides a
government subsidy to the charities chosen by the taxpayers who
make deductible charitable contributions. Every year, the deduction
results in an indirect government subsidy of about $25 billion to
36
charities.
Scholars disagree about the purpose of the charitable contribution
37
deduction. Some argue that it rewards altruism. Others argue that it
provides a more accurate measurement of the income of a charitable
38
donor. And still others argue that the deduction is ineffective or
39
improper, and that it should be eliminated.
The prevailing theory of the charitable contribution deduction
holds that the deduction is an economic subsidy intended to mitigate
40
market failures and government failures in charitable goods.
34 For example, giving alms to a panhandler satisfies the popular definition of charity
but not the federal definition because a donation to an individual cannot be a charitable
contribution. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
35 See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 2–3.
36 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 2001 at 117 tbl.5-3 (2000), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/usbanalytical/BUDGET-2001-PER.pdf;
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 45
(2005), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-29-05.pdf.
37 TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 236 (1990) (“Charitable policy is
currently enacted through a tax code premised on the notion that individual philanthropy is
altruistic and should be rewarded.”); Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax
Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 60–61 (1972).
38 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 314–15 (1972); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1414–15 (1988).
39 Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal”
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831,
880 (1979); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A
Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 379 (1972).
40 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2010)
(“Modern commentators view the deduction for charitable contributions as a federal
subsidy to the recipient firms and argue that the subsidy is justified as a tool for
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According to this economic subsidy theory, free riding creates market
failures by causing the market to undersupply charitable goods, and
majoritarianism creates government failures by causing the
government to undersupply charitable goods. The charitable
contribution deduction solves these market and government failures
41
by subsidizing the production of charitable goods.
D. Market Failures in Public Goods
Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market
42
failures in public goods. A market failure exists when the market
43
allocation of a good is inefficient. Efficient markets are “Pareto
optimal,” meaning that no one’s welfare can be increased without
44
decreasing someone else’s welfare. A market failure exists when
someone’s welfare could be increased without decreasing anyone’s
45
welfare.
46
A public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable. A
good is non-rival if its consumption does not reduce its availability
47
and is non-excludable if its consumption cannot be prevented. For
example, in the absence of intellectual property laws, ideas and
expressions are public goods because they can be consumed an
infinite number of times, and their consumption cannot be prevented.
encouraging the production of goods that would otherwise be underproduced by the
private market.”).
41 See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 698 (2001) [hereinafter The Marketing of Philanthropy];
Gergen, supra note 38, at 1394; Hansmann, supra note 22, at 68, 71; David E. Pozen,
Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 547 (2006); Daniel Shaviro,
Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their TaxExempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997).
42 See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113; Hansmann, supra note 22, at 67–
69.
43 See Market Failures, Public Goods, and Externalities, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/marketfailures.html (last visited Aug. 4,
2014).
44 See Pareto Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pareto
-efficiency.asp (last visited Aug. 4, 2014); Vilfredo Pareto, Biography in The Concise
Encyclopedia of Economics, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library
/Enc/bios/Pareto.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
45 See Market Failures, Public Goods, and Externalities, supra note 43; Pareto
Efficiency, supra note 44; Vilfredo Pareto, supra note 44.
46 Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, LIBR. OF
ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited
Aug. 4, 2014).
47 See id.

FRYE (DO NOT DELETE)

164

10/1/2014 1:24 PM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93, 155

Common examples of public goods include fresh air, lighthouses,
national defense, flood control systems, and street lighting.
Free riding is the consumption of a good without paying the
48
marginal cost of production. Public goods are vulnerable to free
riding because they are non-rival and non-excludable; everyone who
wants to consume a public good can consume it, and the producer of
the good cannot stop them from consuming it. Free riding causes
market failures in public goods because no one is willing to pay the
marginal cost of production.
E. Government Failures in Public Goods
Public choice theory predicts that majoritarianism will cause
49
government failures in public goods. Government failures are
inefficiencies in government regulation of the market allocation of a
50
good. In theory, governments can solve market failures in public
goods by subsidizing their production and taxing their consumption,
thereby forcing the consumers of a good to pay its marginal cost of
production. In other words, government can compensate for free
riding on public goods and ensure that the optimal quantity of a public
good is produced; when government fails to do this, a government
51
failure exists.
Majoritarianism creates government failures in public goods
because it causes governments to satisfy the preferences of the
52
median voter. Majoritarian governments have an incentive to solve
market failures if they affect the median voter but do not have an
incentive to solve market failures that only affect political
53
minorities. As a result, a majoritarian government’s ability to solve
market failures in a public good depends on the uniformity of demand
for that good.
Majoritarian governments can solve market failures in a public
good when demand is uniform because the supply of the good
48 See generally id. (providing the example of people watching fireworks from their
backyards without paying for the show).
49 See, e.g., The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 698; Hansmann, supra
note 22, at 68, 71.
50 See The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 698.
51 Id.
52 “Median voter” refers to someone who is not at either extreme of public opinion but
who instead “sits squarely in the middle of public opinion.” Tyler Cowen, Why Politics Is
Stuck in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07
/business/economy/07view.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Why Politics Is Stuck].
53 Id.
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demanded by the median voter will compensate for free riding. For
example, the demand for drinking water is relatively uniform, so
governments can often solve market failures in drinking water by
building waterworks or subsidizing their private construction.
But majoritarian governments cannot solve market failures
involving a public good when demand is not uniform because the
median voter demand will not compensate for free riding. If the
median voter’s demand for a public good is low but a political
minority’s demand is high, a majoritarian government will only
subsidize production of the good until the median voter’s demand is
54
satisfied. In other words, majoritarian governments can compensate
for free riding by the median voter but cannot compensate for free
riding by political minorities. As a result, majoritarianism causes
government failures in public goods disproportionately demanded by
political minorities.
F. Charitable Goods Resemble Public Goods
The economic subsidy theory argues that charitable goods are
vulnerable to free riding and majoritarianism because they resemble
55
public goods. Many charitable goods resemble public goods
because they are effectively non-rival or non-excludable. For
example, public art is practically non-rival because it can be
consumed by an indefinite number of people, and it is practically nonexcludable because it is available for public consumption. It follows
that free riding should cause market failures in charitable goods to the
extent that they resemble public goods.
Demand for charitable goods is rarely uniform. Often, the median
voter’s demand for a charitable good is low, but a political minority’s
56
demand is high for the charitable good. For example, the median
voter’s demand for a homeless shelter is low, but a homeless person’s
demand is high. Thus, majoritarianism should cause government
failures in charitable goods disproportionately demanded by political
57
minorities.

54
55
56
57

See, e.g., id.
See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113.
Id.
Id.
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II
THE ECONOMIC SUBSIDY THEORY OF CHARITY LAW
A. Charity Law Solves Market and Government Failures in
Charitable Goods
1. The Economic Subsidy Theory
The economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable
contribution deduction is justified because it solves market failures
58
and government failures in charitable goods. If free riding causes
market failures in charitable goods that resemble public goods and
majoritarianism causes government failures in charitable goods
demanded by political minorities, then we should expect an inefficient
market in charitable goods demanded by political minorities. The
economic subsidy theory argues that the deduction solves these
market and government failures by indirectly subsidizing the
production of charitable goods.
In theory, political minorities can solve market and government
failures in charitable goods they demand by subsidizing the
production of those goods themselves. In other words, members of a
political minority may form a charity to produce the goods they
demand and make contributions to that charity.
2. The Problem of Free Riding
Charitable contributions are vulnerable to free riding. The people
who demand a charitable good benefit when others contribute to
charities that produce that good—regardless of whether the
demanding person makes a contribution. While altruism will motivate
some members of a political minority to make charitable
59
contributions, it may not fully compensate for free riding on
charitable contributions. As a consequence, a charity may receive
insufficient contributions to offset market failures and government
failures in a charitable good, resulting in a shortage of the charitable
good.
The economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable
contribution deduction is justified because it solves market failures
and government failures in charitable goods by subsidizing charitable

58
59

Id.
See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 36.
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contributions, thereby compensating for free riding. The deduction
indirectly subsidizes charitable contributions by allowing taxpayers to
61
deduct their contributions from their taxable income. For example,
if the income tax rate is 25%, taxpayers with $100 of taxable income
ordinarily pay $25 in taxes on that income (assuming the taxpayer has
other income). But the charitable contribution deduction allows
taxpayers with $100 of taxable income who donate that entire amount
to a charity to deduct their contribution from their taxable income.
Thus, when the taxpayers donate $100, they have no taxable income
remaining and thereby avoid $25 in taxes. As a result, the net cost to
taxpayers of the $100 charitable contribution is only $75. Even if the
taxpayer had not donated $100, they still would have lost $25 to
income tax. The deduction enables the taxpayers to avoid paying $25
in income tax. Effectively, $100 donation to the charity consists of
$75 donated directly by the taxpayer and $25 in uncollected tax
revenue donated indirectly by the government.
3. How the Deduction Solves Market Failures and Government
Failures
In theory, the deduction can solve market failures in charitable
goods by providing a subsidy that compensates for free riding on
charitable contributions. For example, if a charity needs $100 to
satisfy the demand for a charitable good but free riding results in only
$75 in contributions, the charitable contribution deduction can
compensate for free riding by providing a subsidy of $25.
The deduction can also solve government failures in charitable
goods by subsidizing the production of charitable goods indirectly.
Direct subsidies of charitable goods are vulnerable to majoritarianism
because majoritarian governments will only subsidize the production
of charitable goods when the median voter’s demand is not
62
satisfied. This scenario causes government failures in charitable
goods demanded by political minorities. The indirect subsidy
provided by the deduction can solve some of those government
failures by enabling political minorities to determine which charitable
goods receive a subsidy.
Moreover, the deduction is likely to subsidize the production of
charitable goods affected by market failures and government failures.
60
61
62

See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113.
See I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 2055(a), 2522(a) (2012).
See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
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Charitable contributions are motivated at least in part by altruism, or
63
concern for the welfare of others. One form of altruism is paying for
a public good instead of free riding. Accordingly, altruistic charitable
contributions are likely to pay for charitable goods that are vulnerable
to free riding and thereby help solve market failures. Another form of
altruism is giving to those in need. While majoritarian governments
tend to satisfy the preferences of the median voter, they tend not to
64
satisfy the preferences of political minorities, so those in need tend
to be political minorities. Altruistic charitable contributions are likely
to pay for charitable goods that are vulnerable to majoritarianism and
thereby help solve government failures. If altruistic charitable
contributions tend to solve actual market failures and government
failures, it follows that the subsidy provided by the contributions’ tax
deductions will also tend to solve actual market failures and
government failures.
4. Limits to Solving Market Failures and Government Failures
Of course, the charitable contribution deduction does not and
cannot actually solve all market and government failures in charitable
goods. To begin with, the deduction can only compensate for free
riding on charitable contributions that are made. Some taxpayers may
choose not to contribute and others may lack the resources.
In addition, the deduction is inherently inefficient. The subsidy it
provides is not correlated to the actual amount of free riding on a
charitable donation. Instead, the subsidy provided by the deduction is
determined by a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. As a result, there is no
reason to believe that the subsidy provided by the deduction is
equivalent to the positive externalities produced by the contribution
65
because the two are unrelated to each other.
Nevertheless, perhaps something is better than nothing. While
there is no reason to believe that the charitable contribution deduction
efficiently solves market and government failures in charitable goods,
presumably it solves or aids at least some of them.
63 Altruism, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition
/american_english/altruism (last visited Aug. 5, 2014); see PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 36.
64 Why Politics Is Stuck, supra note 52.
65 A positive externality occurs when “the consumption or production of a good causes
a benefit to a third party.” Positive Externalities, ECONOMICS HELP, http://www
.economicshelp.org/micro-economic-essays/marketfailure/positive-externality/ (last visited
May 29, 2014). For example, education results in a positive externality; the individual
receives a benefit, but society as a whole also benefits. Id.
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B. Vertical Equity and Distributive Justice
While the economic subsidy theory argues that the charitable
contribution deduction solves market and government failures in
charitable goods, critics respond that it lacks vertical equity and
66
reduces distributive justice.
Specifically, they argue that the
deduction lacks vertical equity because it benefits high-income
taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers, and that it reduces
distributive justice because it benefits rich people more than poor
67
people. Critics argue that the deduction benefits high-income
taxpayers more than low-income taxpayers by providing a larger
68
subsidy to high-income taxpayers. As explained above, the subsidy
provided by the charitable contribution deduction is determined by
the donor’s marginal income tax rate: the higher the rate, the larger
69
the subsidy and the lower the rate, the smaller the subsidy.
The federal income tax rate is graduated, meaning that a taxpayer’s
marginal income tax rate increases as the taxpayer’s taxable income
70
increases. There are currently seven income tax brackets for single
taxpayers, ranging from 10% on taxable income less than $9,075 to
71
39.6% on taxable income more than $406,750. As a result, the
charitable contribution deduction provides a larger subsidy to highincome taxpayers than it does to low-income taxpayers. To illustrate,
a taxpayer in the 10% tax bracket who makes a $100 charitable
contribution receives a $10 subsidy, but a taxpayer in the 39.6% tax
bracket who makes a $100 charitable contribution receives a $39.60
subsidy.
Moreover, the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize
the charitable contributions made by most low-income taxpayers
72
because they generally do not itemize their deductions. Taxable
66 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2010).
67 See id. at 549–50.
68 See id.; Benshalom, supra note 17, at 1057.
69 See Charitable Contribution Deductions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non
-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Charitable-Contribution-Deductions (last updated Nov.
1, 2013) [hereinafter Charitable Contribution Deductions].
70 See generally 2013 Tax Table, IRS 74-85, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf
(last visited May 29, 2014) [hereinafter 2013 Tax Table].
71 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX 19 (Mar. 16,
2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf.
72 Benjamin H. Harris & Daniel Baneman, Who Itemizes Deductions?, TAX POL’Y CTR.
(Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001486-Who-Itemizes-Deductions
.pdf.
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income is defined as gross income less any deductions. Taxpayers
may claim either a standard deduction or the sum of their itemized
74
deductions. The charitable contribution deduction is an itemized
75
deduction.
Therefore, taxpayers can deduct their charitable
contributions only if they claim itemized deductions; they cannot
deduct their charitable contributions if they claim a standard
deduction. Most low-income taxpayers claim a standard deduction
rather than itemized deductions because the standard deduction is
76
larger than the sum of their itemized deductions. Accordingly, most
low-income taxpayers cannot deduct their charitable contributions,
and the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize their
77
charitable contributions.
Critics of the charitable contribution deduction also argue that it
benefits the rich more than the poor because it tends to subsidize
charitable goods consumed by the rich rather than charitable goods
78
consumed by the poor. For example, the rich tend to consume
charitable goods produced by museums and universities, while the
poor tend to consume charitable goods produced by food banks and
79
homeless shelters. Donors tend to contribute to charities that
80
produce charitable goods that they personally consume.
81
Because rich people make more charitable contributions, it
follows that the charitable contribution deduction tends to subsidize
charitable goods consumed by the rich rather than charitable goods
consumed by the poor. Obviously, the rich are capable of making
larger charitable contributions than the poor, simply because they
have more wealth to contribute. And increasing income and wealth
inequality may have increased this disparity regarding the capacity to
82
make charitable contributions.
73

See What Is Taxable and Nontaxable Income?, supra note 32.
Harris & Baneman, supra note 72.
75 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS, SCHEDULE A (2013), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf.
76 See PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 37.
77 Id.
78 See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3.
79 See Fleischer, supra note 66, at 549.
80 See id. (citing Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in
TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE
GIVING 27–49 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2007)); ODENDAHL, supra note
37, at 3).
81 See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3.
82 Thomas Piketty & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth and Inheritance in the Long Run 1, 17–
18 (Apr. 6, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/PikettyZucman2014HID.pdf.
74
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Moreover, the rich have a larger incentive to make charitable
contributions compared to the poor based on the fact that the rich tend
to receive a larger subsidy. Wealthy people often earn large incomes,
and poor people tend to have low incomes, so the structure of the
charitable contribution deduction amplifies the subsidy of charitable
goods consumed by the rich. However, these important normative
criticisms of the charitable contribution deduction do not address the
empirical claim that it solves market and government failures in at
least some charitable goods.
C. Charity Failures
While critics of the charitable contribution deduction argue that the
deduction reduces distributive justice and lacks vertical equity, the
deduction is also vulnerable to criticism on efficiency grounds. In
fact, the economic subsidy theory of the deduction implies that it
causes “charity failures,” or failures to solve market failures and
government failures in charitable goods consumed by low-income
taxpayers.
1. What Is a Charity Failure?
According to the economic subsidy theory, the charitable
contribution deduction solves market and government failures for
charitable goods by subsidizing charitable contributions, thereby
compensating for free riding and encouraging more people to
83
donate. This subsidy compensates for free riding on charitable
goods by creating an incentive for marginal donors to contribute to
the charities that produce those goods: the larger the subsidy, the
stronger the incentive; the smaller the subsidy, the weaker the
84
incentive. But the charitable contribution deduction can compensate
for free riding only to the extent that it can subsidize charitable
contributions. If it cannot subsidize a donor’s contributions, it cannot
create an incentive for that donor to make contributions. And if the
deduction cannot subsidize certain contributions, it cannot
compensate for market and government failures associated with those
contributions, causing “charity failures,” or inefficiencies in the
charitable subsidy.

83
84

See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 16, at 109, 113.
See id.
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2. Who Is Affected by Charity Failures?
The economic subsidy theory also implies that charity failures are
more likely to affect low-income taxpayers than high-income
taxpayers because the charitable contribution deduction provides a
larger subsidy to high-income taxpayers than to low-income taxpayers
and cannot provide any subsidy to most low-income taxpayers.
First, charity failures are more likely to affect low-income
taxpayers than high-income taxpayers because high-income taxpayers
receive a much larger subsidy from the charitable contribution
85
deduction. In theory, the size of the subsidy provided by the
charitable contribution deduction should affect the number and value
of charitable contributions. Empirical studies of the effect of the
charitable contribution deduction lend qualified support to this
hypothesis. Some studies have found that changing the size of the
subsidy causes a disproportionately larger change in the number and
86
value of charitable contributions. Other studies have found a weaker
or more qualified response, suggesting that changes in the size of the
subsidy may have a limited effect on the number and value of
87
charitable contributions.
It follows that high-income taxpayers should respond in a more
correlative fashion to changes in the subsidy than low-income
taxpayers, as high-income taxpayers tend to receive a larger subsidy
than low-income taxpayers. In fact, many low-income taxpayers
88
receive no subsidy at all. Several studies have shown that changes
in the charitable deduction subsidy cause a larger change in the
charitable contributions of high-income taxpayers compared to low89
income taxpayers.

85

See Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 69; 2013 Tax Table, supra note

70.
86 See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE
GIVING (1985) (presenting econometric analysis of the relationship between federal taxes
and charitable giving); Daniel Feenberg, Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case
of Charitable Giving, 40 NAT’L TAX J. 629, 632 (1987).
87 Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income,
and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 380–81 (2002); Jon
Bakija & Bradley T. Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and
Income? New Estimates from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615, 692 (2011); William C.
Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable
Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 735 (1995).
88 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
89 Bakija & Heim, supra note 87, at 642; Charles T. Clotfelter, The Impact of Tax
Reform on Charitable Giving: A 1989 Perspective, 7 (NBER Working Paper No. 3273,
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Of course, many low-income taxpayers make charitable
contributions despite the fact they receive only a small subsidy. In
2011, the Joint Committee on Taxation projected that 216,000
taxpayers filed itemized tax returns reporting $10,000 or less with a
$1250 average of charitable contributions per return but only a $72
90
average subsidy. By contrast, a taxpayer in the 39.6% tax bracket
would have received a $495 subsidy for the same contribution of
$1250.
Furthermore, many taxpayers contribute to a charity even though
they receive no subsidy at all. In 2008, charitable organizations
reported $229.28 billion in individual contributions, but individual
itemized tax returns claimed only $172.9 billion in charitable
91
contributions. This suggests that individual taxpayers give nearly
$56.4 billion in charitable contributions for which they received no
92
subsidy whatsoever.
Presumably, some taxpayers who filed
itemized returns failed to claim some of their charitable contributions,
and some charities may have claimed more contributions than they
actually received. But taxpayers who did not file itemized returns
made many of these unclaimed charitable contributions, and they
thereby missed out on subsidies they would have received.
“Hypersalience,” or the mistaken belief that a deduction applies,
may compensate for free riding on some unsubsidized charitable
93
contributions. A deduction is “salient” when it creates an incentive
for the taxpayers it affects, and is “hypersalient” when it creates an
incentive for taxpayers it does not affect but who believe they are
94
affected. The charitable contribution deduction may be hypersalient
because it appears to create an incentive for some non-itemizing
taxpayers to make contributions even though they cannot claim the
deduction. In other words, some non-itemizing taxpayers appear to
make charitable contributions because they believe that the
95
contributions will be deductible even though they are not.

1990), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226702 (click on
“Download This Paper”).
90 PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 33, at 37 tbl.2.
91 Id. at 39 tbls.2, 3.
92 Id. at 37–38.
93 Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction
to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2012).
94 Id. at 1309, 1311.
95 Id. at 1340.
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However, hypersalience probably cannot fully compensate for free
riding on all unsubsidized charitable contributions. While the
deduction appears to be hypersalient for some non-itemizing
taxpayers, it is almost certainly not hypersalient for all non-itemizing
taxpayers. At least some non-itemizing taxpayers must realize that
they cannot claim the deduction based on information provided by the
IRS, professional tax preparers, or their own experience of the IRS
denying a claimed deduction. Moreover, while the deduction may be
hypersalient to non-itemizers, presumably it is more salient and
provides a larger incentive to taxpayers who actually receive a
subsidy than taxpayers who do not. Accordingly, while hypersalience
probably reduces charity failures, it is unlikely to eliminate them
because it cannot fully compensate for the difference between the
subsidy provided to low-income and high-income taxpayers.
While the charitable contribution deduction creates a strong
incentive for high-income taxpayers to make charitable contributions,
it creates, at best, a weak incentive for low-income taxpayers to make
charitable contributions. Therefore, the economic subsidy theory
implies that the charitable contribution deduction compensates for
free riding on high-income taxpayers’ charitable contributions more
effectively than it compensates for free riding on low-income
taxpayers’ charitable contributions. The deduction provides a larger
incentive to marginal high-income donors than to marginal lowincome donors.
The economic subsidy theory additionally implies that the
charitable contribution deduction will tend to cause charity failures in
charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers. If donors
contribute to charities that produce the charitable goods they
personally consume, this implies that the market of charitable goods
consumed by high-income taxpayers is more efficient than the market
of charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers. It also means
that charities that produce goods that high-income taxpayers consume
are more likely to receive the optimal amount of contributions. And if
the deduction provides a weak incentive for low-income individuals
to make charitable contributions, then charities that produce
charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers are less likely to
receive the optimal amount of contributions.
In other words, the economic subsidy theory implies that the
charitable contribution deduction is more likely to solve market
failures and government failures in charitable goods consumed by
high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers. As a result, the
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economic subsidy theory implies that the charitable contribution
deduction will tend to cause charities to supply the optimal amount of
charitable goods consumed by high-income taxpayers but
undersupply charitable goods consumed by low-income taxpayers.
III
SOLVING CHARITY FAILURES
A. Reforming the Charitable Contribution Deduction
Charitable contribution deduction critics argue that it is unfair.
They have proposed several reforms intended to increase
96
distributional justice and improve vertical equity. The proposed
reforms include: reducing the subsidy that the charitable contribution
deduction provides to high-income taxpayers, allowing non-itemizing
taxpayers to claim the charitable contribution deduction, providing a
tax credit to low-income taxpayers who make charitable
97
contributions, and providing direct grants to charities.
These proposed reforms may increase distributional justice and
improve vertical equity, but they cannot solve the charity failures
caused by the charitable contribution deduction because none of them
can efficiently compensate the low-income taxpayers for the free
riding on their charitable contributions.
Reducing the subsidy for high-income taxpayers may improve
vertical equity, but it cannot solve charity failures because this
strategy does nothing to compensate for free riding on charitable
contributions. On the contrary, it could increase charity failures while
reducing the marginal incentive for high-income taxpayers to make
98
charitable contributions.
1. Solving Charity Failures Through Tax Policy
In theory, the government could solve charity failures though the
tax code by extending the charitable contribution deduction to non96 See, e.g., House Tax Reform Proposal Limits Charitable Deduction for All,
PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIG. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.philanthropynewsdigest.org /news
/house-tax-reform-proposal-limits-charitable-deduction-for-all (proposing a reform that
limits the charitable deduction for all income levels to only those donations that are in
excess of two percent of the taxpayer’s gross income).
97 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 808–27 (4th ed. 2010).
98 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information,
and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 256 (2009).
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itemizers or offering tax credits for charitable contributions to lowincome taxpayers. However, tax-based solutions to charity failures are
likely to be inefficient and costly.
a. Extending the Deduction to Non-Itemizers
Allowing non-itemizing taxpayers to claim the charitable
contribution deduction would solve some, but not all, charity failures.
The subsidy for low-income taxpayers under this model is not large
enough to compensate for free riding.
Several studies have found that low-income taxpayers do not
respond strongly to changes in the subsidy provided by the charitable
99
contribution deduction.
From 1982 to 1986, non-itemizing
taxpayers could deduct an increasing percentage of their charitable
100
While charitable contributions by non-itemizing
contributions.
taxpayers increased when their maximum charitable contribution
deduction increased, the response was smaller than the response of
101
itemizing taxpayers. Moreover, much of the increase in charitable
contributions by non-itemizing taxpayers was attributable to
taxpayers choosing not to itemize in order to receive a larger
deduction, rather than taxpayers choosing to increase their charitable
102
contributions.
b. Providing Tax Credits for Charitable Contributions to Low-Income
Taxpayers
Providing a tax credit to low-income taxpayers who make
charitable contributions cannot solve charity failures because it would
be costly, inefficient, and often ineffective. The diminishing marginal
103
utility of consumption
makes it more expensive to induce a low99 See Joseph Cordes, John O’Hare & Eugene Steuerle, Extending the Charitable
Deduction to Nonitemizers: Policy Issues and Options, 7 URBAN INST. 1, 4 (2000); David
H. Eaton, Charitable Contributions and Tax Price Elasticities for Nonitemizing
Taxpayers, 7 IAER 431, 432 (2001); cf. Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by
Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax Incentives? New Evidence, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 195, 202
(1999).
100 In 1982 and 1983, non-itemizing taxpayers could deduct 25% of their first $100 in
charitable contributions; in 1984, they could deduct 25% of their first $300 in charitable
contributions; in 1985, they could deduct half of their charitable contributions; and in 1986
they could deduct all of their charitable contributions. Eaton, supra note 99, at 431–32.
101 Duquette, supra note 99, at 203; Eaton, supra note 99, at 441.
102 See Duquette, supra note 99, at 196, 199–200.
103 The “diminishing marginal utility of consumption” refers to the notion that, while
consumption of other products remains the same, a consumer experiences “a decline in the
marginal utility that person derives from consuming each additional unit of that product.”
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income taxpayer to make a charitable contribution than to induce a
104
high-income taxpayer to make a charitable contribution.
Presumably, the cost of inducing enough low-income taxpayers to
make charitable contributions would soon exceed the amount of those
charitable contributions. Moreover, to the extent that the charitable
contribution is hypersalient, some low-income taxpayers are making
charitable contributions in the mistaken belief that they can deduct
105
those contributions and receive a subsidy.
Presumably, providing
an actual subsidy via a tax credit will have a limited effect on their
charitable contributions.
More importantly, most low-income taxpayers could not receive a
tax credit because they do not itemize their deductions. In 2010, only
about 30% of taxpayers itemized; the number of low-income
106
taxpayers who itemized was even lower.
Fewer than 4% of
taxpayers in the 0% tax bracket itemized, and about 16% of taxpayers
107
in the 10% bracket itemized. Many low-income taxpayers have no
108
tax liability and do not bother to file tax returns at all.
2. Solving Charity Failures Through Grants
The government could also solve charity failures by providing
direct grants to charities, but this approach will be inefficient because
majoritarianism makes it vulnerable to government failures. The
economic subsidy theory argues that the government can solve market
failures in charitable goods demanded by political majorities but
cannot solve market failures in goods demanded by political
109
minorities. In other words, the government would likely give direct
grants to charities that produce charitable goods demanded by
political majorities but would not give direct grants to charities that
produce goods demanded by political minorities. As a result, direct
Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/l/lawofdiminishingutility.asp (last visited May 29, 2014). An example of this concept
exists in buffet restaurants: “each additional plate of food provides less utility than the one
before.” Id.
104 Schizer, supra note 98, at 234.
105 Faulhaber, supra note 93, at 1340.
106 Harris & Baneman, supra note 72.
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Paying Zero Federal Income Tax
Grows to 43.4 Million, TAX FOUND (Mar. 30, 2006), http://taxfoundation.org/article
/number-americans-paying-zero-federal-income-tax-grows-434-million. In 2006, about
fifteen million individuals and families were not required to file tax returns. Id.
109 See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.
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grants can only solve charity failures in charitable goods demanded
by political majorities and cannot solve charity failures in charitable
goods demanded by political minorities. For example, if a political
minority consisting of low-income taxpayers demands a charitable
good, charity failures will cause an undersupply of the good because
the charitable contribution deduction cannot subsidize contributions
to charities that produce the good. Government failures will also
prevent the government from solving those charity failures because
the good is not demanded by a political majority.
B. Crowdfunding
If the economic subsidy theory of the charitable contribution
deduction is correct, it implies that we should expect it to cause
charity failures in charitable goods consumed by political minorities
of low-income taxpayers. This Article argues that crowdfunding is
successful because it solves at least some of the charity failures
caused by the charitable contribution deduction by using rewards,
rather than subsidies, to compensate for free riding on donations made
by low-income taxpayers.
110
In other words, the remarkable success of crowdfunding
supports the hypothesis of the economic subsidy theory by showing
that charity failures exist and that they can be solved. Of course,
crowdfunding cannot solve all charity failures. But examining its
successes may help identify charity failures that can be solved by
other means.
Crowdfunding is a way of using the Internet to ask the public for
111
contributions to fund a project.
It is a form of crowdsourcing, or
112
using the Internet to ask the public to help accomplish a task.
Crowdfunding makes it efficient to fund a project by asking many
people for small amounts of money rather than asking a few people
113
for large amounts of money.

110

See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
See Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding:
Tapping the Right Crowd, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 1, 2 (July 9, 2013), http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1836873 (click “Download This Paper”).
112 See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006), http://www.wired
.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. Crowdsourcing is a portmanteau of “crowd” and
“outsourcing.” See id.
113 Belleflamme, Lambert & Schwienbacher, supra note 111, at 2–3.
111
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While the concept behind crowdfunding is old, Internet-based
114
crowdfunding is quite new. Nevertheless, the use of crowdfunding
has grown very rapidly. Crowdfunding organizations have
proliferated and enabled individuals, organizations, and charities to
raise substantial amounts of money for a wide range of projects, both
115
domestically and internationally.
As discussed above, many different crowdfunding organizations
provide many different crowdfunding platforms. A crowdfunding
platform is a website that allows a recipient to describe a project and
116
ask the public for contributions to the project.
Depending on the
crowdfunding platform, the recipient may also offer something in
117
exchange for contributions.
Most crowdfunding platforms require
recipients to set a funding goal of a specific amount of money in a
118
Many crowdfunding platforms provide
specific amount of time.
that contributions are contingent on the satisfaction of that funding
119
goal. Most crowdfunding organizations charge a fee of five to ten
120
percent of the contributions to a project.
Crowdfunding finances many different kinds of projects, but most
crowdfunding platforms focus on a particular category of projects.
121
For example, Spot.us focused on journalism;
33needs and
122
PROfounders, Startup
StartSomeGood focus on social enterprise;
123
Kickstarter,
Addict, and peerbackers focus on entrepreneurs;
Indiegogo, RocketHub, Hatchfund, and NewJelly focus on creative

114 Bradford, supra note 14, at 11 (arguing that Internet-based crowdfunding began in
2005).
115 See id. at 11–14.
116 Prive, supra note 9.
117 See, e.g., Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, supra note 5.
118 See, e.g., id.
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., Start Your Project., KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/learn?ref
=what_is_kickstarter (last visited Aug. 7, 2014) (click “What is Kickstarter’s fee?”).
121 Marianne McCarthy, Can You Still Spot.us? Crowdfunding Pioneer Slumps Under
APM, PBS: MEDIASHIFT (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2012/12/can
-you-still-spot-us-crowdfunding-pioneer-slumps-under-apm354/.
122 How It Works: Criteria, STARTSOMEGOOD, http://startsomegood.com/Help/Values
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014); 33needs, CROWDSOURCING.ORG, http://www.crowdsourcing
.org/site/33needs/33needscom/2487 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
123 About, STARTUP ADDICT, http://www.startupaddict.com/crowdfunding/page/about
(last visited Aug. 13, 2014); About peerbackers, PEERBACKERS, http://peerbackers.com
/media-kit/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014); PROFOUNDERS CAPITAL, http://www.profounders
capital.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
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125

projects;
PledgeMusic focuses on musicians;
FirstGiving
126
127
DonorsChoose.org focuses on education;
focuses on charities;
128
ioby focuses on environmental projects; AppsFunder focuses on
129
130
mobile apps;
and Quirky focuses on inventors.
The market for
crowdfunding platforms is quite volatile. New platforms are
131
constantly appearing. Some are successful, and others disappear.
Crowdfunding is used for commercial or charitable purposes or a
132
mixture of the two. For example, the Imagination Station created a
133
crowdfunding project to create a statute of RoboCop in Detroit.
Under federal law, the Imagination Station is not a charity because it
134
has not applied for tax-exempt status, but the project was intended
to create a work of public art, which is a charitable purpose. Broadly
speaking, one could say that a crowdfunded project has a commercial
purpose to the extent that its purpose is to produce a commercial good
and has a charitable purpose to the extent that its purpose is to
produce a charitable good.
Contributions to a charitable crowdfunded project may or may not
be charitable contributions. Individuals, businesses, and charities can
all use crowdfunding platforms to solicit contributions to
135
crowdfunded projects.
Some charitable crowdfunded projects are

124 About Us, HATCHFUND, http://www.hatchfund.org/about/us (last visited Aug. 13,
2014); About Us, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/our-story, (last visited
Aug. 13, 2014); About Us, NEWJELLY, http://www.newjelly.com/About-us/ (last visited
Aug. 13, 2014); Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, supra note 5; see Our
Movement, ROCKETHUB, http://www.rockethub.com/about (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
125 PLEDGEMUSIC, http://www.pledgemusic.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
126 FIRSTGIVING, http://www.firstgiving.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
127 DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, http://www.donorschoose.org/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
128 About ioby, IOBY, http://www.ioby.org/about/our-story (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
129 APPSFUNDER, http://www.appsfunder.com/us (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
130 About, QUIRKY, https://www.quirky.com/about (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
131 For example, MicroPlace, which focused on microfinance, stopped operating on
January 14, 2014. The Future of MicroPlace, MICROPLACE, www.microplace.com (last
visited Aug. 7, 2014).
132 See generally Bradford, supra note 14, at 12–15. Among other things, crowdfunding
reminds us that charity takes many forms. See, e.g., Invest in Breasts, MY FREE IMPLANTS,
http://myfreeimplants.com/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
133 Detroit Needs a Statue of Robocop!, supra note 2.
134 See Exempt Organizations Select Check, supra note 4.
135 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 15–16; see, e.g., id. at 25.
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136

created by charities. Others are sponsored by charities but created
137
by individuals or businesses.
If a charitable crowdfunded project is created or sponsored by a
charity, contributions to the project are generally charitable
contributions. But if it is not created or sponsored by a charity,
contributions are not charitable contributions. While many
crowdfunded projects have a charitable purpose, contributions to
many of those projects are not charitable contributions.
Most crowdfunding platforms are businesses operating for a
138
profit.
However, crowdfunding platforms administered by
businesses may host projects created by charities, just as businesses
139
may solicit charitable contributions on behalf of charities.
And
many crowdfunded projects created by individuals and businesses
have a charitable purpose in a colloquial sense. For example,
GiveForward enables individuals to create crowdfunding projects to
140
raise funds for an individual’s medical treatment.
While a
contribution to an individual is not a charitable contribution under
federal law, contributions to a person in need are charitable in a
141
colloquial sense.
1. Models of Crowdfunding
There are four distinct crowdfunding models, and they are defined
by what recipients offer in exchange for contributions: (1) the
donation model, (2) the reward model, (3) the loan model, and (4) the
142
equity model. Many crowdfunding platforms use only one model,
143
but some use multiple models.

136

See, e.g., id. at 15.
See Gene Takagi, Fundraising & Charitable Giving: Nonprofit Crowdfunding
Risks, NONPROFIT LAW BLOG (July 8, 2014), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/category
/fundraising/.
138 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 142.
139 4.76.51.3 Professional Fund-Raisers, IRS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/irm
/part4/irm_04-076-051.html#d0e331.
140 About Us–Online Fundraising Websites, GIVEFORWARD, http://www.giveforward
.com/p/about-us (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
141 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
142 Bradford, supra note 14, at 14–15. Bradford’s pre-purchase model is omitted in this
analysis because it is duplicative of the reward model. See id.
143 Id. at 15.
137
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a. The Donation Model
Under the donation model, recipients offer nothing to donors in
144
exchange for contributions. Unsurprisingly, the donation model is
used primarily by crowdfunding platforms that focus on charitable
145
projects. In fact, the crowdfunding platforms are often operated by
146
charities and the recipients of the projects are usually charities. As
a result, contributions to this model of crowdfunding projects are
often deductible, as a contribution to a crowdfunded project is a
147
charitable contribution if the recipient is a charity.
Examples of
crowdfunding platforms that use the donation model include
148
GlobalGiving and DonorsChoose.org.
The donation model cannot solve the charity failures created by the
charitable contribution deduction because it cannot compensate for
free riding on charitable contributions made by low-income
taxpayers. As explained above, the charitable contribution deduction
causes charity failures because the deduction cannot subsidize many
149
types of charitable contributions from low-income taxpayers.
But
while the donation model cannot solve charity failures by subsidizing
contributions, it may mitigate charity failures associated with the
charitable contribution deduction by reducing transaction costs.
Donors tend to contribute to charities that produce the charitable
150
goods they consume.
But charities often produce many different
kinds of charitable goods. Donors who only consume some of the
charitable goods that a charity produces will have a stronger incentive
to make a charitable contribution if the charity uses their contribution
to produce the charitable goods they consume rather than the ones
they do not.
The donation model enables a charity to determine more efficiently
the demand for each of the charitable goods it produces by asking
donors to fund specific projects rather than asking for general
144

Id.
Id.
146 Id.
147 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
148 See About GlobalGiving, GLOBALGIVING, http://www.globalgiving.org/aboutus/
(last visited Aug. 7, 2014); About: How It Works, DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, http://www
.donorschoose.org/about (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
149 See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text.
150 See Fleischer, supra note 66, at 549 (citing Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy
Relation to Equality, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE
INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27–49 (William Damon & Susan Verducci eds.,
2007)); ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3.
145
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donations. Thus, the number and value of charitable contributions to a
particular project more accurately reflect the donor demand for the
charitable good produced by that project. If a project is funded, the
charity knows that demand is high, and it can produce the charitable
good in question; if a project is not funded, the charity can reevaluate
the demand for that charitable good.
In other words, the donation model of crowdsourcing may mitigate
some charity failures by reducing transaction costs. But it cannot
solve the charity failures caused by the charitable contribution
deduction because the donation model cannot subsidize charitable
contributions from low-income taxpayers. Without an alternative
subsidy, the donation model cannot compensate for free riding on
contributions made by low-income taxpayers.
b. The Reward Model
Under the reward model, recipients offer rewards to donors in
151
The reward model is used by
exchange for contributions.
crowdfunding platforms that focus on both charitable and commercial
152
projects.
While the reward for contributing to a project can be
almost anything, rewards generally relate to the particular project in
153
question and depend on the size of the contribution. A reward may
have any value, and the perceived value of a reward often depends on
154
Contributors who make small
the size of the contribution.
contributions receive low-value rewards; contributors who make large
155
contributions receive high-value rewards. Low-value rewards often
include postcards, e-mails, or some form of recognition. High-value
rewards are often unique and closely related to the recipient of the
156
contribution. For example, an artist may offer a unique art object in
exchange for a large contribution or a filmmaker may offer an
157
executive producer credit.
Historically, large charities and charities that operated a medium of
mass communication, like public radio and television stations, have
used rewards to provide an incentive for marginal donors to make
151

Bradford, supra note 14, at 16.
See An Introduction to Crowdfunding, NESTA (July 2012), http://www.em-a.eu
/fileadmin/content/REALISE_IT_2/REALISE_IT_3/IntroToCrowdfunding.pdf.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See generally id. (describing the general types of rewards donors receive).
157 Bradford, supra note 14, at 16.
152
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small contributions. For example, contributors to the Sierra Club or
National Public Radio may receive a reward, like a coffee mug or a
tote bag, in exchange for contributing twenty-five or fifty dollars.
Smaller charities are much less likely to offer rewards of this kind.
The unlikelihood of smaller charities offering rewards is consistent
with the hypothesis that using rewards to incentivize small
contributions is efficient only if the marginal cost of charitable
solicitation is low. Large charities and charities that operate a medium
of mass communication have a low marginal cost of solicitation, so
they can afford to offer a reward in exchange for a small contribution.
By contrast, small charities have historically had a high marginal cost
of solicitation, so they could not afford to offer rewards, and often
158
were forced to hire professional solicitors. Crowdfunding levels the
playing field, reducing the marginal cost of solicitation for small
charities by providing access to a medium of mass communication
and enabling the charities to cheaply and easily reach large numbers
of potential donors.
Kickstarter, which focuses on creative projects, is one of the most
successful contemporary crowdfunding platforms using the reward
159
model.
Kickstarter requires users to specify their fundraising goal
160
Contributors
and the duration of their fundraising campaign.
161
pledge to donate. If a Kickstarter project meets or exceeds its goal
by the end of the campaign, the creator of the project receives all of
162
the pledges.
If it does not, the creator of the project receives
163
If a Kickstarter project is funded, Kickstarter takes a
nothing.
164
commission of five percent of the total contributions to the project.
Kickstarter requires recipients to offer rewards in exchange for
165
contributions, but does specify the nature of the rewards.
While
Kickstarter rewards can consist of almost anything, they are often the
158

See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600,
605, 624 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit fraud claims against
professional fundraisers hired by charities).
159 Bradford, supra note 14, at 16; Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited May 30, 2014)
[hereinafter Kickstarter Basics].
160 Kickstarter Basics, supra note 159.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Dave Roos, How Kickstarter Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://money.howstuff
works.com/kickstarter1.htm (last visited May 30, 2014).
165 Kickstarter Basics, supra note 159.
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product of the project for which they are a reward.
A Kickstarter
reward can also have any relationship to the size of the contribution
167
for which it is a reward.
Kickstarter projects that are predominantly commercial tend to
offer rewards that are close in value to the amount of the contribution.
Of course, the donor will wait some time to receive the product, and
there is no guarantee that it will ever be successfully produced. As a
result, most Kickstarter projects effectively offer rewards worth less
168
than the amount of the contribution.
Kickstarter projects that are
predominantly charitable tend to offer rewards that are much less
valuable than the amount of the contribution. Kickstarter projects that
propose to fund a community art project tend to offer recognition or
some other token of appreciation.
In general, successful Kickstarter projects are funded primarily by
169
small contributions. For example, one recent project received 703
contributions totaling $13,606, including 495 contributions of $10 or
170
more, and about 83% of its contributions were $50 or less. This is
typical of Kickstarter projects: 83% of funded projects offer backers a
171
reward for a pledge of less than $20. In addition, projects that offer
backers a reward for a pledge of less than $20 have a 54% success
172
rate, but projects that do not only have a 35% success rate.
The reward model solves charity failures caused by the charitable
contribution deduction because rewards can subsidize charitable
contributions made by low-income taxpayers and thereby compensate
for free riding on their charitable contributions. Under the charitable

166 Creator Handbook: Rewards, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help
/handbook/rewards (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Kickstarter prohibits certain kinds of
rewards. See Prohibited Items, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules
/prohibited (last visited Aug. 8, 2014). For example, a Kickstarter project cannot offer a
chance at a prize (illegal gambling) and cannot offer equity in a project (unregistered
securities). See id. In addition, Kickstarter appears to disallow some projects and rewards
on policy grounds. See id.
167 See Creator Handbook: Rewards, supra note 166.
168 See Bradford, supra note 14, at 17.
169 See Dave Roos, Tips for Funding a Kickstarter Project, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/kickstarter3.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2014).
170 IronSpike, Poorcraft: A Comic Book Guide to Frugal Urban Suburban Living,
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ironspike/poorcraft-a-comic-book
KICKSTARTER,
-guide-to-frugal-urban-and?pos=1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2014); Yancey Strickler, The Price
is Right, in Kickstarter Blog, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.kickstarter
.com/blog/the-price-is-right [hereinafter The Price is Right].
171 The Price is Right, supra note 170.
172 Id.
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contribution deduction, donors receive a tax deduction. Under the
reward model of crowdfunding, donors receive rewards instead.
While low-income taxpayers receive little or no benefit from a tax
deduction, they receive the full benefit of a reward. Moreover, donors
who make small contributions receive only a small benefit from a tax
deduction but may receive a significant benefit from a reward.
Many charities offer rewards in exchange for contributions. For
example, many public radio and television stations use a rewards
174
model to incentivize donations.
A donor who makes a small
charitable contribution may receive a coffee cup or a tote bag. A
donor who makes a large charitable contribution may receive a
naming opportunity or board position.
The fact that charities commonly provide rewards for donations
suggests that they implicitly recognize that the charitable contribution
deduction causes charity failures, some of which can be solved by
rewards. However, the charitable contribution deduction discourages
rewards because a donor who receives a quid pro quo cannot deduct a
175
charitable contribution. Essentially, a charitable contribution is not
deductible if the contributor receives something of more than nominal
176
value in exchange for the contribution.
The remarkable success of the rewards model of crowdfunding
suggests that rewards can subsidize donations from low-income
donors that cannot be subsidized by the charitable contribution
deduction. Most Kickstarter projects are not created by charities, so
contributions cannot be deducted, and the average Kickstarter pledge
177
is between twenty-five and fifty dollars.
In other words, most
Kickstarter donors are making relatively small, nondeductible
contributions in exchange for rewards.
The hypothesis that rewards can subsidize donations from lowincome donors is supported by the fact that the reward model of
173

Charitable Contribution Deductions, supra note 69.
See, e.g., Support Louisville Public Media, LOUISVILLE PUBLIC MEDIA,
https://louisvillepublicmedia.webconnex.com/contribute (last visited Aug. 9. 2014)
(allowing a donor to choose to receive a cookbook, a DVD, a CD, or no reward in
exchange for a contribution of $180 to Louisville Public Media).
175 See Charitable Contributions–Quid Pro Quo Contributions, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Charitable-Contributions-Quid
-Pro-Quo-Contributions (last updated Mar. 5, 2014).
176 See The Marketing of Philanthropy, supra note 41, at 662–63.
177 Fred Benenson & Yancey Strickler, Trends in Pricing and Duration, in Kickstarter
Blog, KICKSTARTER BLOG (Sept. 21, 2010), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/trends-in
-pricing-and-duration.
174
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crowdfunding has proven particularly effective for creative projects.
Studies show that most low-income taxpayers do not contribute to arts
178
While the charitable contribution deduction can
organizations.
incentivize marginal, high-income donors to make charitable
contributions to arts organizations, crowdfunding appears to provide
the incentive necessary for low-income taxpayers to contribute to arts
organizations.
Because crowdfunded projects can offer a wide range of rewards in
exchange for a wide range of contributions, crowdfunding enables
projects to better tailor rewards to the preferences of their donors.
This makes crowdfunding more efficient than traditional forms of
fundraising and enables crowdfunded projects to generate more
contributions than direct solicitation.
Indeed, the use of crowdfunding for creative projects illuminates
this hypothesis. For quite some time, donors have made charitable
179
contributions to creative projects using “fiscal sponsors.”
A
180
donation is deductible only if it is a charitable contribution.
Accordingly, a donation to a creative project is deductible only if the
creative project is the project of a charity. A donation to an individual
is not deductible; in order to deduct donations to individuals, donors
contribute to a charity that acts as a “fiscal sponsor” to the
181
The donor then suggests that the charity use the
individual.
182
donation to fund the individual’s creative project.
The charity
183
receives an administrative fee up to ten percent for this service.
The result is that the donor gets a deduction, the charity gets a fee,
and the individual gets the money. Fiscal sponsorship appeals to highincome donors because it allows them to utilize the charitable
contribution deduction. It also appeals to charitable foundations that
have restrictions on making distributions to individuals.
The reward model of crowdfunding operates in much the same way
as fiscal sponsorship, with the exception that the donor receives a
reward rather than a deduction. Essentially, fiscal sponsorship appeals

178

See ODENDAHL, supra note 37, at 3.
See George Johnson & David Jones, K. Community Foundations, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopick94.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Forms of fiscal
sponsorship date back to the 1940s. See id.
180 Fiscal Sponsors, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, http://www.councilofnonprofits
.org/fiscal-sponsorship (last visited Aug. 9, 2014).
181 Id.; see Johnson & Jones, supra note 179.
182 See Johnson & Jones, supra at 179.
183 Id.
179
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to high-income taxpayers for whom the charitable contribution
deduction is valuable, and the reward model of crowdfunding appeals
to low-income taxpayers for whom rewards are valuable. Indeed,
many crowdfunded projects allow donors to decide whether they wish
to donate through the crowdfunding platform and take a reward or
donate through a fiscal sponsor and take a deduction. For example, I
co-created two Kickstarter projects relating to the film Our Nixon
184
(2013), which I co-produced.
Both projects informed contributors
that they could contribute to our fiscal sponsor if they wanted to take
a deduction for their contribution. We found that some donors who
contributed one thousand dollars or more chose to use our fiscal
sponsor rather than Kickstarter.
c. The Lending and Equity Models
Under the lending model, recipients offer to repay contributions
185
over time, often with interest. Thus, under this model, contributors
186
Under the equity model,
expect a return on their investment.
187
recipients offer a share of their profits. The loan and equity models
are used primarily by crowdfunding platforms that focus on
188
commercial projects.
These models differ from the other types
because they ask contributors to invest in a project rather than make a
189
donation or purchase.
2. The Legality of the Lending and Equity Models
Initially, the viability of the lending and equity models was
190
dubious, as they appeared to violate federal securities laws. In fact,
crowdfunding platform PROfounders tried to implement the equity
model but folded in early 2012, citing “the current regulatory
191
environment.”
184 Brian L. Frye & Penny Lane, Our Nixon, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter
.com/projects/1222291754/our-nixon-found-footage-documentary (last visited Aug. 9,
2014); Brian L. Frye & Penny Lane, Our Nixon–Premiere at SXSW & Beyond!,
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1222291754/our-nixon-premiere-at
-sxsw-and-beyond (last visited Aug. 9, 2014).
185 Bradford, supra note 14, at 20.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 24.
188 Id. at 21.
189 Id. at 20.
190 Id. at 29.
191 Joyce M. Rosenberg, New Crowdfunding Law Helps Small Businesses Find
Investors, HUFFINGTON POST: NEWS AND TRENDS (Apr. 12, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www
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But on April 12, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or JOBS Act, which eased
various securities regulations in order to make it easier for small
192
businesses to raise capital. Among other provisions, the JOBS Act
includes the CROWDFUND Act, creating an exemption intended to
193
This exemption allows
permit the equity model of crowdfunding.
companies to fundraise up to one million dollars from unaccredited
investors without registering with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, provided that the funds are raised through a registered
194
broker or crowdfunding platform.
The exemption also limits the
amount of money that can be raised from an unaccredited investor
195
However, businesses cannot
based on that investor’s income.
currently take advantage of this exemption because the SEC has not
196
completed the rulemaking process.
3. Solving Charity Failures with the Lending and Equity Models
The lending model and the equity model of crowdfunding could
solve some charity failures. In particular, they could provide access to
capital for individuals and businesses engaged in charitable activities.
However, they cannot solve most charity failures because they
anticipate a return on investment.
Producing charitable goods is generally not a profitable enterprise.
If it were, there would be no need for charity. Indeed, classical
economics predicts market failures in charitable goods precisely
197
because they are not profitable to produce.
The donation and reward models of crowdfunding help solve
charity failures by making charitable giving easier and providing
targeted incentives to marginal, low-income donors. The donation
model provides no subsidy, and the reward model provides a subsidy
that costs less than the contribution. As a consequence, the donation

.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/12/new-crowdfunding-law-help_n_1420708.html (internal
quotation marks omitted).
192 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-05, 126 Stat.
306, 315 (codified in 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
193 Id. The Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical NonDisclosure Act (CROWDFUND Act) is one component of the broader JOBS Act. See id.
194 See id.
195 Crowdfunding, 33 Fed. Reg. 9470 (2013), 34 Fed Reg. 70741 (2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts 200, 277, 232, 239, 240, 249).
196 See id.
197 See supra notes 42–48, 55 and accompanying text.
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and reward models are useful to individuals and organizations
producing unprofitable charitable goods.
By contrast, the lending and equity models of crowdfunding
anticipate a return on investment. As a consequence, they are of
limited utility to individuals and organizations that produce
unprofitable charitable goods because lenders and investors are
unlikely to lend to or invest in charitable activities with a projected
negative return. As a consequence, the lending and equity models of
crowdfunding are unlikely to solve most charity failures.
IV
CROWDFUNDING SOLVES SOME CHARITY FAILURES
While all of the forms of crowdfunding may help solve charity
failures, the reward model of crowdfunding appears to solve charity
failures most effectively. Unlike the other models of crowdfunding,
the reward model compensates for free riding on charitable
contributions, and it does so without requiring that charitable
activities generate a profit. Most importantly, the reward model of
crowdfunding can provide an incentive for low-income donors to
make a contribution by offering a targeted reward rather than a
deduction.
The donation model of crowdfunding may solve some charity
failures by making charitable giving easier and more efficient.
Crowdfunding platforms are generally streamlined and intuitive; they
make it easy for charities to create projects and for donors to make
contributions. In addition, they enable charities to reach more people
more easily, and crowdfunding platforms enable donors to review a
broader range of charities. Perhaps more importantly, crowdfunding
platforms encourage charities to think about how to pitch projects
effectively and to identify charitable goods that are demanded.
However, the only incentive that the donation model can provide is a
deduction for charitable recipients. Thus, the donation model cannot
solve the charity failures caused by the deduction.
The reward model of crowdfunding retains all of the advantages of
the donation model. However, it also solves some of the charity
failures caused by the deduction. The deduction causes charity
failures because it cannot compensate for free riding on charitable
contributions made by low-income taxpayers. But the reward model
of crowdfunding can compensate for free riding on those
contributions by providing a reward rather than a deduction. While
low-income taxpayers usually cannot take a deduction, they can
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receive a reward. In other words, low-income taxpayers receive no
value from the subsidy provided by the deduction, but they receive
the full value of a reward from a crowdfunded project.
The reward model of crowdfunding can compensate for free riding
more efficiently than the deduction because the value of the reward is
adjustable in relation to the project, but the value of the subsidy
provided by the deduction is not. The subsidy the deduction provides
does not depend on the recipient of the charitable contributions, so
some projects will receive a subsidy that is too large, and some will
receive a subsidy that is too small. But crowdfunded projects can
offer many different rewards calibrated to the incentive necessary for
a particular project. Projects that are predominantly charitable may
offer rewards with little value, as little additional incentive beyond
altruism is necessary to induce contributions. But projects that are
predominantly commercial may offer high value rewards as altruism
will not motivate sufficient contributions.
While the lending and equity models of crowdfunding may also
help solve charity failures by enabling charities to raise capital more
efficiently, they cannot directly address the charity failures caused by
the deduction. It will be interesting to see how they are used once the
IRS completes the rulemaking process.
Essentially, crowdfunding appears to be successful, at least in part,
because it provides a technological solution to certain charity failures
caused by the deduction. Of course, crowdfunding cannot solve all
charity failures caused by the deduction. Many low-income taxpayers
lack convenient access to computers or the Internet, and they may not
198
be familiar with crowdfunding platforms.
Others may find
crowdfunding an unappealing way of making charitable contributions.
And the reward model of crowdfunding appears to work more
effectively for some kinds of charitable projects than others. In
particular, it seems to work well for creative projects but less well for
199
social justice projects.
This suggests that it may be necessary to
develop alternative ways of solving charity failures in charitable
goods that are not suited to crowdfunding.

198 Edward Wyatt, Most of U.S. Is Wired, but Millions Aren’t Plugged in, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/technology/a-push-to-connect
-millions-who-live-offline-to-the-internet.html.
199 For example, Kickstarter is many orders of magnitude more successful than
Hatchfund. See Kickstarter Basics, supra note 159; How We Work, HATCHFUND,
http://www.hatchfund.org/get_involved/artists (last visited Aug. 10, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
The charitable contribution deduction solves market failures and
government failures in charitable goods by subsidizing charitable
contributions. But the charitable contribution deduction causes charity
failures because it cannot subsidize the charitable contributions made
by low-income taxpayers. Crowdfunding provides a technological
solution to some of those charity failures by offering rewards rather
than subsidies.

